Dov Monderer is a Luxenberg Professor of Economics and Operations Research at the Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion—Israel Institute of Technology.
He received his B.Sc. and M.Sc. in Mathematics (both Summa Cum Laude) from Tel-Aviv University. In his Ph.D. (in Mathematics at Tel Aviv University) he specialized in Game Theory.
He was a visiting professor at the Department of Mathematics at the University of California at Los Angeles (1986–1988), at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University (1988–1989), at the Department of Economics at Queen's University, Ontario, Canada (1992–1993), and at the Department of Computer Science, Washington University, St. Louis (1999–2000).
He was an associate editor of Mathematics of Operations Research (1995–2000), and of Games and Economic Behavior (1996–2004). He is an associate editor of the International Journal of Game Theory.
He was the Dean of the faculty, January 1, 2003–December 31, 2005.
Papers in refereed journals
- Measure-Based Values of Non-atomic Games Mathematics of Operations Research ,1986,11, 321--335.
- A Probabilistic Problem Arising in Economics
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1988, 17, 321-338.
- Values and Semivalues on Subspaces of Finite Games
International Journal of Game Theory,1988, 17, 301--310.
- Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs, With D. Samet
Games and Economic Behavior 1 ,1989, 170--190.
- Values of Smooth Non-Atomic Games: The Method of Multilinear Approximation, With A. Neyman in The Shapley Value, ed. by A.E. Roth, Cambridge University Press,1989, New York.
- Asymptotic Measure-Based Values of Non-Atomic Games
Mathematics of Operations Research, 1989, 14, 737--744.
- Weighted Majority Games Have Many mu-Values
International Journal of Game Theory, 1989, 18, 321--326.
- A Milnor Condition for Non-Atomic Lipschitz Games and its Applications
Mathematics of Operations Research, 1990, 15 , 714--723.
- On the Symmetry Axiom for Values of Non-Atomic Games , With W.H. Ruckles Int. J. Math.and Math. Sciences,1990, 13, 165--170.
- Quasivalues on Subspaces of Games, With I. Gilboa, International Journal of Game Theory, 1991, 19, 353--363.
- The Stochastic Choice Problem: A Game Theoretic Approach
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1992, 36 , 547--554.
- A game Theoretic Approach to the Binary Stochastic Choice Problem , With I. Gilboa Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1992, 36, 555--572.
- Weighted Shapley Values and the Core,With D. Samet and L.S. Shapley International Journal of Game Theory ,1992,21, 27--39.
- Asymptotic Properties in Dynamic Programming , With S. Sorin International Journal of Game Theory,1993, 22, 1--11.
- Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming , With E. Lehrer Games and Economics Behavior ,1994, 6, 97--113.
- Low discounting and the Upper Long-Run Value ,With E. Lehrer Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6, 262--282.
- Stochastic Common Learning , With D. Samet Games and Economic Behavior 1995,9, 161--171.
- Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests ,With L.S. Shapley Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 1, 258--265.
An explanation to (1.6) in fictitious play--monderer-shapley-revised on 7.12.17
- Core and Stable sets of Large Games Arising in Economics , With E. Einy, R. Holzman, and B. Shitovitz
Journal of Economic Theory , 1996, 1, 200--211.
- Proximity of Information in Games with Incomplete Information,With D. Samet
Mathematics of Operations Research , 1996,3, 707--725.
- A 2X2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property , With A. Sela
Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 14, 144--148.
- Potential Games , With L.S. Shapley
Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 14, 124--143.
- Multistage Situations , With J. Greenberg, and B. Shitobitz
Econometrica, 1996, 64, 1415--1437.
- Belief Affirming in Learning Processes , With D. Samet and A. Sela
Journal of Economic Theory , 1996,73,438--453.
- Potentials and Weighted Values of Non-Atomic Games ,With S. Hart
Mathematics of Operations Research , 1997, 22, 619--631.
- Core Equivalence Theorems for Infinite Convex Games ,With E. Einy, R. Holzman, and B. Shitovitz
Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 76, 1-12.
- Dynamic Non Bayesian Decision Making , With M. Tennenholtz
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research , 1997,7, 231--248.
- The Least Core, Kernel and Bargaining Sets of Large Games ,With E. Einy, and D. Moreno
Economic Theory , 1998,11, 585--601.
- A Learning Approach to Auctions ,With S. Hon-Snir, and A. Sela
Journal of Economic Theory, 1998, 82, 65--88.
- On the Least Core and the Mas-Collel Bargaining Set ,With E. Einy, R. Holzman
Games and Economic Behavior , 1999,28 , 181-188.
- Distributed Games ,With M. Tennenholtz
Games and Economic Behavior, 1999, 28 , 55--72.
- Dynamic Non-Bayesian Decision Making in Multi-Agent Systems ,With M. Tennenholtz
Annals of mathematics and Artificial Intelligence , 1999, 25 , 91-106.
- K-Price Auctions ,With M. Tennenholtz
Games and Economic Behavior , 2000,31 220-244.
- Optimal Auctions Revisited ,With M. Tennenholtz
Artificial Intelligence , 2000,120 , 29--42.
- Feasible Net Income Distributions Under Income Tax Evasion: An Equilibrium Analysis ,With M. Landsberger, and I. Talmor
Journal of Public Economic Theory , 2000,2 135-156.
- Introduction: Economics and Artificial Intelligence ,With M. Tennenholtz, and H. Varian
Games and Economic Behavior ,2001,35 1--5.
- Variations of the Shapley Value ,With D. Samet
HandBook of Game Theory No. III (Ed. R.J. Aumann and S. Hart ) Elsevier Science, Amsterdam , 2002.
- K-price auctions: Revenue Inequalities, Utility Equivalence, and Competition in Auction Design (Previously titled: Internet Auctions - Are They Gamblers' Attraction?),With M. Tennenholtz
Economic Theory, 2004,24, 255--270.
- Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctionsresource, With R. Holzman, N. Kfir-Dahav, and M. Tennenholtz
Games and Economic Behavior, 2004,47, 104-123.
- Characterization of Ex Post Equilibrium in the VCG Combinatorial Auctions, With R. Holzman
Games and Economic Behavior, 2004,47, 87--103.
- k-Implementation, With M. Tennenholtz
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research,2004, 21, 37--62.
An extended abstract in: 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2003).
Section 4 in this paper contains errors. For details see the two papers:
R. Eidenbenz, Y. A. Oswald, S. Schmid, and R. Wattenhofer. Mechanism Design by Creditability. In Proc. 1st International Conference on Combinatorial Opti- mization and Applications (COCOA), Springer LNCS 4616, 2007.
Raphael Eidenbenz, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schmid, and Roger Wattenhofer. Manipulation in Games. 18th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC), Sendai, Japan, December 2007.
- Solution-Based Congestion Games
Advances in Mathematical Economics,2006, 8, 397--409.
- Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize, With M. Tennenholtz
Artificial Intelligence ,2007, 171(8), 448--452.
- On the Value of Correlation , With Itai Ashlagi and Moshe Tennenholtz
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research ,2008, 33, 575--613.
A conference version appeared at the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2005).
- Strong Mediated Equilibrium, With Moshe Tennenholtz
Artificial Intelligence ,2009, 173, 180-195.
A conference version appeared at the Twenty-First National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-06).
- Mediators in Position Auctions,With Itai Ashlagi and Moshe Tennenholtz
Games and Economic Behavior ,2009, Vol 67, Issue 1.
A conference version appeared at the ACM-EC 2007.
- Two-Terminal Routing Games with Unknown Active Players ,With Itai Ashlagi and Moshe Tennenholtz
Artificial Intelligence Journal ,2009, Vol 173, Issue 15, 1441—1455.
Conference versions of part of this paper are "Symmetric Routing Games with an Unknown Set of Active Players", presented at AAMAS-07, and "Resource Selection Games with Unknown Number of Players", presented at AAMAS-06.
- Monotonicity and Implementability with Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, and Avinatan Hassidim
Econometrica, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September, 2010), 1749–1772.
- supplementary material
Conference and other versions of part of this paper are "Monotonicity and Implementability" extended abstract, EC' 08, ACM
conference on Electronic Commerce, Chicago, Il, USA ,July 08-12,2008, and "Implementable Allocation Rules" ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2008.
- Simultaneos Ad Auctions With Itai Ashlagi and Moshe Tennenholtz ,2011, Mathematics of Operations Research Vol. 36, No. 1, 2011, pp. 1-13 Presented at Dagstuhl 2011.
- Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs, With R. Holzman. International journal of Game Theory , Vol 44, issue 3, 647—666, 2015.
Papers in refereed conference proceedings (not appearing above)
- Distributed Games: From Mechanisms to Protocols,With M. Tennenholtz Sixteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-99), 32-37.
- Mechanism Design for Resource Bounded Agents ,With N. Kfir-Dahav, and M. Tennenholtz
Robust Learning Equilibrium,With Itai Ashlagi and Moshe Tennenholtz22nd Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2006).
- Learning Equilibrium in Resource Selection Games,With Itai Ashlagi and Moshe Tennenholtz(AAAI 07)
- Multipotential GamesTwentieth International joint conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-07).
Unpublished working papers
- To Commit or Not to Commit? , With Micael Landsberger , 1994.
- Fictitious Play and No-Cycling Conditions , With Aner Sela , 1997.
- Part of the material in this manuscript appears at the following paper of Aner Sela:Aner Sela (2000), Fictitious play in 2x3 Games, Games and Economic Behavior,31,152-162.
- Asymptotically Optimal Multi-Object Auctions, With M. Tennenholtz, 1999.
- Irit Talmor, M.Sc., (Operations Research), 1992: "Signaling Games".
- Aner Sela, M.Sc., (Economics), 1992: "Learning Processes in Game Theory".
- Ilana Weismann, M.Sc., (Applied Math.), 1992: "Bargaining sets".
- Zeev Nutov, M.Sc., (Applied Math.), 1992: "The Binary Stochastic Choice Problem". Co-supervisor: Michal Penn.
- Yaron Leitner, M.Sc., (Operations Research), 1995: “Collusion in Noncooperative Games”.
- Eyal Chermony, M.Sc., (Economics), 1996: “Auctions and Imperfect Competition”.
- Shlomit Hon-Snir, M.Sc., (Economics), 1996: “Discrete Models and Learning in Auctions”.
- Aner Sela, Ph.D., (Economics), 1996: “Learning Processes in Games”. Co-supervisor, Dov Samet.
- Shlomit Hon-Snir, Ph.D., (Economics), 2001 “Utility Equivalence in Auctions”.
- Noa Kfir-Dahav, Ph.D., (Information Systems), 2003: “Resource Bounded Mechanism Design". Co-Supervisor: Moshe Tennenholtz.
- Itai Ashlagi, M.Sc., (Operations Research), 2005: “The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games". Co-Supervisor: Moshe Tennenholtz.
- Itai Ashlagi, Ph.D., (Operations Research), 2008: ”Pre-Bayesian Games”. Co-Supervisor: Moshe Tennenholtz.
- Raphael Paul Eidenbenz, Ph.D., (ETH Zürich , Computer Science), 2012: ” Coping with Selﬁshness in Distributed Systems: Mechanism Design in Multi-Core and Peer-to-Peer Systemss”. Co-Supervisors: Roger Peter Wattenhofer (chair), Karl Aberer.
- Raphael Paul Eidenbenz, Ph.D., (ETH Zürich , computer science), 2012: "Coping with Selﬁshness in Distributed Systems: Mechanism Design in Multi-Core and Peer-to-Peer Systems".
Co-Supervisors: Roger Peter Wattenhofer (chair), Karl Aberer.
Game Theory Economics and Computer Science