Itai received his PhD in Mathematics from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Center for the Study of Rationality (2010).
During 2010–2012, Itai was a post-doctorate research fellow at the Nuffield College University of Oxford.
Itai Joined the Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion in 2012 as an assistant professor.
Itai's research spans aspects of game theory, including equilibrium theory, learning in games, evolutionary game theory, and Bayesian learning in social networks.
``Infinite Sequential Games with Perfect but Incomplete Information,'' (with Yehuda "John" Levy) International Journal of Game Theory. 40 (2) p. 207-213, 2011.
``Rationalizability in Continuous Games,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics. 46 (5) p. 212-224, 2010
``Average Testing and Pareto Efficiency,'' (with Yakov Babichenko) Journal of Economic Theory 147 p. 2376-2398, 2012.
"Determinacy of Games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring" (with Yehuda "John" Levy ) Games and Economic Behavior Volume 91, May 2015, Pages 166–185 .
"Transfer implementation in congestion games" Dynamic Games and Applications June 2015, Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 228-238.
"The Logic of Backward Induction" (with Robert J. Aumann) Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 159, Part A, September 2015, Pages 443–464.
"Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games" (with H. Peyton Young ) Econometrica, 2016, VOLUME 84, ISSUE 2.
Random Extensive Form Games (with Yakov Babichenko) Journal of Economic Theory Volume 166, November 2016, Pages 517–535.
Inferring Beliefs from Actions (with Manuel Mueller-Frank) Games and Economic Behavior. Volume 102, March 2017, Pages 455–461.
Payoff Externalities and Social Learning Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 104, July 2017, Pages 392-410.
Sequential Commitment Games (with Yakov Babichenko and Moshe Tennenholtz) Accepted for publication at Games and Economic Behavior.
Papers in Refereed Conference Proceedings
Forecast Aggregation (with Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky) EC 2017
Simple Aproximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players (with Yakov Babichenko) EC 2017
When is the Crowd Wise? (with Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky)
Private Bayesian Persuasion (with Yakov Babichenko)
Bayesian Learning in Markets with Common Value (with Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky)
A Characterization of Adequate Learning for General Sequential Social Learning Models (with Manuel Mueller-Frank)
Multidimensional Social Learning (with Manuel Mueller-Frank)
Bayesian Learning. Social Networks. Evolutionary Game Theory. Population Games.