A senior lecturer at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, department of Industrial Engineering and Management. Prior to that, I was a Post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Research on Computation and Society, Harvard University.
I completed my PhD at the Hebrew University (computer science) in 2013, under the supervision of Prof. Jeffrey S. Rosenschein.
My PhD dissertation received an honorable mention for 2013 Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award (IFAAMAS) and I was awarded the 2013 Michael B. Maschler Prize to an outstanding research student by the Israeli Chapter of the Game Theory Society.
In my work, I apply a game-theoretic approach to understand and characterize strategic behavior in multi-agent interactions, where agents are self-interested. The challenges involved include both economic factors and a significant computational aspect, such as computing optimal strategies or an equilibrium point. While part of my research deals with algorithmic problems arising from playing and designing games, I’m more interested in the other direction, of how tools from computer science and artificial intelligence can assist us in solving fundamental economic and game-theoretic questions.
One of the biggest obstacles in applying game theory to real-life problems is that the classic model of a rational agent does not describe accurately enough the strategic behavior of people in most interactions. In fact, any single rule is probably not enough to capture the variety of behaviors demonstrated in a society.
My present research is concerned with making realistic assumptions about the knowledge and capabilities of agents of different types, as well as comparing theoretical predictions with empirical and experimental data. Within this broad field, known by the title behavioral game theory, I focus on the perception of uncertainty and how it affects strategic behavior.
Beyond deepening our understanding of games in general, my research is aimed at designing better mechanisms founded on more accurate behavioral models and applying them in the domains of voting, group scheduling, resource allocation, crowdsourcing, routing in networks, and more.
Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Players with Behavioral Biases. Reshef Meir and David Parkes. Manuscript.
Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations. Gil Kalai, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz. Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC ‘15), June 2015, Portland, OR. To appear.
Strategic Voting Behavior in Doodle Polls. James Zou, Reshef Meir, and David Parkes. Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing (CSCW ’15), March 2015, Vancouver, BC, Canada, pp. 464-472.
A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria, Reshef Meir, Omer Lev, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC ‘14), June 2014, Palo Alto, CA, pp. 313-330.
On the Value of Using Group Discounts under Price Competition, Reshef Meir, Tyler Lu, Moshe Tennenholtz and Craig Boutilier. Artificial Intelligence, 2014, Volume 216, pp. 163-178.
Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games over Interaction Networks, Reshef Meir, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Proceedings of the 27th ACM Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI ‘13), July 2013, Bellevue, WA, pp. 690-696.
Algorithms for Strategyproof Classification, Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Artificial Intelligence, 2012, Volume 186, pp. 123-156.