Assoc. Prof. Ron Lavi

Economics

Overview

Ron Lavi is an associate professor at the faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management at Technion. He joined the faculty in 2006, after completing his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the Hebrew University, and after conducting post-doctoral studies at the California Institute of Technology. His research focuses on topics on the border between Computer Science and Economics, and in particular on ways to design auctions and other economic mechanisms over the Internet. His works represent a successful integration of economic models with computer science analysis methods. He has published in top economics journals as well as in top computer science conferences and journals. Ron has consulted for several major companies on issues related to auction design, including Google (2008), Microsoft Research (2011–2012), and Yahoo! (2012–2013). During the years 2013–2015, he was on sabbatical at UC Berkeley. In 2009 he received an Outstanding Paper Award for a paper presented at the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. In 2012 he received an Award for Research Cooperation and High Excellence in Science (ARCHES)—a prize funded by the Federal German Ministry of Education and Research, via the MINERVA foundation. In 2013 he received a Marie-Curie IOF Fellowship from the European Commission for research.

Selected Publications

R. Lavi and N. Nisan, “Competitive Analysis of Incentive Compatible On-Line Auctions”, Theoretical Computer Science, 310, pp. 159 –180, 2004

S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan, and A. Sen, “Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation”, Econometrica, 74(4), pp. 1109–1132, 2006

R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, and N. Nisan, “Two Simplified Proofs for Roberts' Theorem”, Social Choice and Welfare, 32, pp. 407–423, 2009

M. Babaioff, R. Lavi, and E. Pavlov, “Single Value Combinatorial Auctions and Algorithmic Implementation in Undominated Strategies”, Journal of the ACM, 56(1), pp. 4:1–4:32, 2009

R. Lavi and C. Swamy, “Truthful Mechanism Design for Multi-Dimensional Scheduling via Cycle Monotonicity”, Games and Economic Behavior, 67, pp. 99–124, 2009

I. Ashlagi, M. Braverman, A. Hassidim, R. Lavi, and M. Tennenholtz, “Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness”, The Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances), 10(1), Article 20 (30 pages), 2010

R. Lavi and C. Swamy, “Truthful and Near-optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming”, Journal of the ACM, 58(6), pp. 25:1–25:24, 2011

R. Lavi and Marina May, “A Note on the Incompatibility of Strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in Quasi-linear Settings with Public Budget Constraints”. Economics Letters, 115, pp. 100–103, 2012

S. Dobzinski, R. Lavi, and N. Nisan, “Multi-Unit Auctions with Budget Limits”. Games and Economic Behavior, 74, pp. 486–503, 2012

I. Ashlagi, S. Dobzinski, and R. Lavi, “An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms”. Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(2), pp. 244–258, 2012

R. Lavi and S. Oren, “Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Item Case”. Games and Economic Behavior, 76(2), pp. 439–456, 2012

R. Lavi and E. Segev, “Efficiency Levels in Sequential Auctions with Dynamic Arrivals”. International Journal of Game Theory, to appear.

R. Lavi and N. Nisan, “Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items”. Journal of Economic Theory, to appear.

Conference Publications

R. Lavi and A. Barak, “Improving the PVM Daemon Network Performance by Direct Network Access”, Proceedings of the 5th EuroPVM/MPI'98, Springer, pp. 44–51, 1998.

R. Lavi and N. Nisan, “Competitive Analysis of Incentive Compatible On-Line Auctions”,Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), ACM Press, pp. 233–241, 2000.

R. Lavi and A. Barak, “The Home Model and Competitive Algorithms for Load Balancing in a Computing Cluster”,Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), IEEE Computer Society, pp. 127–134, 2001.

R. Lavi, A. Mu’alem, and N. Nisan, “Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions”, Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), IEEE Computer Society, pp. 574–583, 2003.

Y. Bartal, F.Y.L. Chin, M. Chrobak, S.P.Y. Fung, W. Jawor, R. Lavi, J. Sgall, T. Tichy, “Online competitive algorithms for maximizing weighted throughput of unit jobs”,Proceedings of the 21st Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), Springer, pp. 187–198, 2004.

R. Lavi and C. Swamy, “Truthful and Near-optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming”,Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), IEEE Computer Society, pp. 595–604, 2005.

M. Babaioff, R. Lavi, and E. Pavlov, “Mechanism Design for Single-Value Domains”,Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), AAAI Press / The MIT Press, pp. 241–247, 2005.

R. Lavi and N. Nisan,“Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items”,Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), SIAM Press, pp. 1146–1155, 2005.

M. Babaioff, R. Lavi, and E. Pavlov, “Impersonation-Based Mechanisms”,Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), AAAI Press, 2006.

M. Babaioff, R. Lavi, and E. Pavlov, “Single Value Combinatorial Auctions and Implementation in Undominated Strategies”,Proceedings of the 17th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), ACM Press, pp. 1054–1063, 2006.

R. Lavi and C. Swamy, “Truthful Mechanism Design for Multi-Dimensional Scheduling via Cycle Monotonicity”, Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), ACM Press, pp. 252–261, 2007.

S. Dobzinski, R. Lavi, and N. Nisan, “Multi-Unit Auctions with Budget Limits”,Proceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), IEEE Computer Society, pp. 250–259, 2008.

I. Ashlagi, S. Dobzinski, and R. Lavi, “An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms”, Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), ACM Press, pp. 169–176, 2009.

R. Lavi and S. Oren, “Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Item Case (working paper)”. Proceedings of the Second Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA), 2011.

R. Lavi and Marina May, “A Note on the Incompatibility of Strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in Quasi-linear Settings with Public Budget Constraints (working paper)”. Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2011

O. Compte, R. Lavi and E. Segev, “Efficiency Levels in Sequential English Auctions with Dynamic Arrivals”. Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), ACM Press, 2012

H. Fu, R. Kleinberg, and R. Lavi, “Conditional Equilibrium Outcomes via Ascending Price Processes with Applications to Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding”. Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), ACM Press, 2012

N. Alon, M. Babaioff, R. Karidi, R. Lavi, and M. Tennenholtz, “Sequential Voting with Externalities: Herding in Social Networks”. Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), ACM Press, 2012

U. Feige, R. Lavi, and M. Tennenholtz, “Competition among Asymmetric Sellers with Fixed Supply”. Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), ACM Press, 2013

Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi and Amitabh Trehan, “Composition Games for Distributed Systems: the EU Grant games”. Proceedings of the 27th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), AAAI Press, 2013 (Brief announcement in the Proceedings of the 25th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC’11), abstract also in the Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon'12))

Research

Auctions and Market Design
The design of efficient economic mechanisms (mechanism design)
Algorithmic mechanism design
Theoretical aspects of electronic commerce
Game theory

Contact Info

Room 302 Bloomfield Building
+972-4-829-4410