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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//wp-events-plugin.com//5.981//EN
TZID:Asia/Jerusalem
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Asia/Jerusalem
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:17@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201028T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201028T123000
DTSTAMP:20201109T060748Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/when-both-players-choose
-dominated-actions-underweighting-rare-events-in-2-player-repeated-games/
SUMMARY:When both players choose dominated actions: Underweighting rare eve
nts in 2-player repeated games [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars
\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Ori Plonsky\n Advisors: \n Where: Zoom From:\nTechnion\nA
bstract:\n\nBehavioral decision studies of individuals who make repeated d
ecisions with feedback reveal robust evidence that people behave as if the
y believe “it won’t happen to me”\, a phenomenon coined underweighti
ng of rare events. We experimentally show that the tendency to underweight
rare events persists in 2-person repeated games with stochastic payoffs\,
and that other agents can learn to exploit it. In a simultaneous-move asy
mmetric 2x2 game\, most row players consistently choose a stochastically d
ominated action that provides a better payoff most of the time but on aver
age leads to a large loss over the equilibrium prediction\, behavior consi
stent with underweighting of the rare event. In response\, most column pla
yers learn to exploit this bias by choosing a strictly dominated action th
at is worse for the row players on average but better most of the time. Th
at is\, due to underweighting of rare events by the row players\, most dya
ds converge to a profile of two dominated strategies. A second study rules
out different explanations like boredom\, altruism or risk seeking.\n\nJo
int work with Yefim Roth (University of Haifa)\n\nLink to Seminar Zoom
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:23@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201111T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201111T123000
DTSTAMP:20201109T060933Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/an-algorithmic-framework
-for-approximating-maximin-share-allocation-of-chores/
SUMMARY:An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation
of Chores [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Xin Huang\n Advisors: \n Where: ZOOM From:\nTechnion\nAbst
ract:\n\nIn this paper\, we consider the problem of how to fairly dividing
m indivisible chores among n agents. The fairness measure we considered h
ere is the maximin share. The previous best known result is that there alw
ays exists a 4/3 approximation maximin share allocation. With our algorit
hm\, we can always find a 11/9 approximation maximin share allocation for
any instance. We also discuss how to improve the efficiency of the algorit
hm and its connection to the job scheduling problem.\n\nSeminar Zoom Link
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:28@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201125T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201125T123000
DTSTAMP:20201118T173908Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/fair-cake-division/
SUMMARY:Fair Cake Division [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n
\n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Nidhi Rathi \n Advisors: \n Where: ZOOM From:\nthe Indian
Institute of Science\nAbstract:\n\nThe classic cake-cutting problem provid
es a model for addressing fair allocation of a divisible resource (metapho
rically\, the cake) among agents with distinct preferences. Envy-free (fai
r) cake divisions with contiguous pieces are known to exist under mild con
ditions\, but it is computationally hard to find them. In this talk\, I wi
ll present two of my recent results which complements these existential (a
nd non-constructive) guarantees by developing polynomial-time approximatio
n algorithms and by identifying computationally tractable instances for fa
ir cake division. First\, I will discuss an efficient algorithm for findin
g a cake division whose envy is multiplicatively bounded by 1/3. Moving fo
rward\, I will present a result that develops efficient cake-cutting algor
ithms to find envy-free divisions for a broad class of valuations (that sa
tisfies the monotone likelihood ratios property). In particular\, our algo
rithmic result holds when the agents' valuations are induced by linear tra
nslations of any log-concave function\, such as Gaussian\, exponential\, l
inear\, or binomial.\n\n \;\n\nJoint work with Siddharth Barman\, Eshw
ar Ram Arunchaleswaran and Rachitesh Kumar\n\n \;\n\nZoom Link
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:31@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201209T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201209T113000
DTSTAMP:20201203T070657Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/incomplete-information-v
cg-contracts-for-common-agency/
SUMMARY:Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency [ \n Gam
e Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Tal Alon \n Advisors: \n Where: Zoom From:\nTechnion\nAbst
ract:\nWe study the social efficiency of contracts as economic mechanisms
when multiple principals simultaneously manage a common agent. We consider
an incomplete-information setting: The agent chooses an unobservable acti
on that induces both a cost for the agent and an expected value for each p
rincipal. The sum of these terms is referred to as the resulting social we
lfare. The agent’s choice is incentivized by payment schemes (“contrac
ts”) set forth by the principals\, who have different private values for
different stochastic outcomes of the agent’s choice. We enforce two sta
ndard properties of contracts: individual rationality a.k.a. IR (for the p
rincipals)\, and limited liability a.k.a. LL (for the agent).\n\nJoint wor
k with Ron Lavi\, Elisheva Shamash\, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen\n\nZoom Link
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:39@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201223T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20201223T123000
DTSTAMP:20201220T115150Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/settling-the-complexity-
of-nash-equilibrium-in-congestion-games/
SUMMARY:A Market-Inspired Bidding Scheme for Peer Review Paper Assignment [
\n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Reshef Meir \n Advisors: \n Where: Zoom From:\nTechnion\nA
bstract:\n\nWe propose a market-inspired bidding scheme for the assignment
of paper reviews in large academic conferences. We provide an analysis of
the incentives of reviewers during the bidding phase\, when reviewers hav
e both private costs and some information about the demand for each paper\
; and their goal is to obtain the best possible k papers for a predetermin
ed k.\n\nWe show that by assigning `budgets' to reviewers and a `price' fo
r every paper that is (roughly) proportional to its demand\, the best resp
onse of a reviewer is to bid sincerely\, i.e.\, on her most favorite pape
rs\, and match the budget even when it is not enforced. This game-theore
tic analysis is based on a simple extension of the Trading Post mechanism.
\nWe show via extensive simulations on bidding data from real conferences\
, that our bidding scheme would substantially improve both the bid distr
ibution and the resulting assignment.\n\n \;\n\njoint work with Jerome
Lang\, Lulien Lesca\, Nick Mattei\, and Natan Kaminsky\n\nZoom Link\n\n&n
bsp\;
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:40@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210106T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210106T123000
DTSTAMP:20201230T172116Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/settling-the-complexity-
of-nash-equilibrium-in-congestion-games-2/
SUMMARY:Settling the complexity of Nash equilibrium in congestion games [ \
n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Yakov Babichenko \n Advisors: \n Where: Zoom From:\nTechni
on\nAbstract:\n\nWe consider (i) the problem of finding a (possibly mixed)
Nash equilibrium in congestion game\, and (ii) the problem of finding an
(exponential precision) fixed point of the gradient descent dynamics of a
smooth function f ∶ [0\, 1]^n → R. We prove that these problems are eq
uivalent. Our result holds for various explicit descriptions of f\, rangin
g from (almost general) arithmetic circuits\, to degree-5 polynomials. By
a very recent result of [FGHS20]\, this implies that these problems are PP
AD ∩ PLS-complete. As a corollary\, we also obtain the following equival
ence of complexity classes:\n\nCCLS = PPAD∩PLS\n\nZoom https://technion.
zoom.us/j/95592625013
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:51@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210120T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210120T123000
DTSTAMP:20210113T082053Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/prophet-and-secretary-on
line-algorithms-for-matching-in-general-graphs/
SUMMARY:Prophet and Secretary Online Algorithms for Matching in General Gra
phs [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Michal Feldman \n Advisors: \n Where: ZOOM From:\nTel-Avi
v University\nAbstract:\n\nProphet and Secretary Online Algorithms for Mat
ching in General Graphs\n\nA common tension in market scenarios is choosin
g the right timing to commit to a decision. This tension is captured by th
e mathematical literature of optimal stopping theory\, within two models t
hat have become to be known as the secretary problem and the prophet inequ
ality. In these models\, a sequence of originally-unknown values arrive on
e by one. Upon arrival\, the online algorithm observes the value and shoul
d decide whether or not to accept it. In secretary settings\, the value se
quence is arbitrary\, but the values arrive in a uniformly random order. I
n prophet settings\, every value is drawn from a known probability distrib
ution\, but the arrival order is arbitrary.\n\nIn this talk I will review
the basic settings of secretary and prophet\, as well as previous extensio
ns to matching in bipartite graphs with 1-sided vertex arrival. I will the
n present our recent work\, which studies online algorithms (in both secre
tary and prophet settings) for matching in *general* graphs\, under both v
ertex- and edge-arrival models. We provide tight competitive ratios for bo
th secretary and prophet matching scenarios under vertex arrival. Under ed
ge arrival\, we provide competitive ratios that improve upon the state of
the art.\n\nBased on the following joint work with Tomer Ezra\, Nick Gravi
n\, and Zhihao Tang:\n\nhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2002.09807\n\nhttps://arxiv.
org/abs/2011.01559\n\nBe rational and attend\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://techn
ion.zoom.us/j/95592625013
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:74@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210519T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210519T123000
DTSTAMP:20210512T130803Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/collective-information-a
cquisition/
SUMMARY:Collective Information Acquisition [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n
Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Ran Wilat \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 From:\nBe
n-Gurion University\nAbstract:\n\nWe consider the problem faced by a group
of players who bargain over what public signal to acquire before deciding
on a collective action. The players differ in their privately known state
-dependent payoffs from taking the action\, and therefore differ also in t
heir willingness to pay for the public signal. We take a mechanism design
approach to characterize the frontier of outcomes achievable via bargainin
g over information. We identify novel distortions in the optimal informati
on structure that arise from the information asymmetry and because\, after
the signal is realized\, the outcome is determined in equilibrium of a su
bsequent voting game.\n\n(joint with K. Eliaz)
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:76@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210602T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210602T123000
DTSTAMP:20210530T052855Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/informative-tests-in-sig
naling-environments/
SUMMARY:Informative Tests in Signaling Environments [ \n Game Theory Se
minar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Ran Weksler\n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 From:\nU
niversity of Haifa\nAbstract:\n\nWe study a receiver’s learning problem
of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test that
the receiver chooses induces a signaling subgame. Thus\, in addition to t
he direct effect of the chosen test on the information that the receiver o
btains\, it also has an indirect effect on the receiver’s information th
rough the sender’s signaling strategy. We analyze how signaling consider
ations affect the receiver’s preference relation over tests. Specificall
y\, we find that the receiver’s preference relation does not comply with
Blackwell’s order. Our findings may help shed light on phenomena such a
s grade inflation and information coarsening.\n\n \;\n\n(joint with B.
Zick)
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:81@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210616T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210616T123000
DTSTAMP:20210609T064041Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/barter-exchange-with-len
gth-sensitive-utility-functions/
SUMMARY:Barter Exchange with Length Sensitive Utility Functions [ \n Ga
me Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Matan-el Shpiro \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 Fro
m:\nTechnion\nAbstract:\n\nConsider a \\emph{barter exchange} problem over
a finite set of agents\, where each agent owns an item and is also associ
ated with a (privately known) \\emph{wish list} of items belonging to the
other agents. An outcome of the problem is a (re)allocation of the items t
o the agents such that each agent either keeps her own item or receives an
item from her (reported) wish list\, subject to the constraint that the l
ength of the trading cycles induced by the allocation is up-bounded by a p
respecified \\emph{length bound} $k$. The utility of an agent from an allo
cation is $0$ if she keeps her own item\; and it is $\\lambda(\\ell)$ if s
he receives an item from her (true) wish list and participates in a tradin
g cycle of length $2 \\leq \\ell \\leq k$\, where $\\lambda$ is a prespeci
fied monotonically non-increasing \\emph{length function}. (The agent incu
rs a large dis-utility if she receives an item that is neither hers nor be
longs to her wish list.)\n\nIn this talk\, we investigate the aforemention
ed barter exchange problem from the perspective of mechanism design withou
t money\, aiming for truthful (and individually rational) mechanisms whose
objective is to maximize the \\emph{social welfare}. As the construction
of a social welfare maximizing allocation is computationally intractable f
or length bounds $k \\geq 3$\, we focus on (computationally efficient) tru
thful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. In particula
r\, we establish upper and lower bounds on the guaranteed approximation ra
tio\, expressed in terms of the length bound $k$ and the length function $
\\lambda$. Our main technical contribution is an algorithmic tool that can
be viewed as a truthful version of the \\emph{local search} paradigm.\n\n
(joint with Y. Emek)
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:104@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210707T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210707T113000
DTSTAMP:20210630T095052Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/learner-private-sequenti
al-learning-and-convex-optimization/
SUMMARY:Learner-Private Sequential Learning and Convex Optimization [ \n
Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Kuang Xu \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 From:\nSta
nford University\nAbstract:\n\nThe increasing ubiquity of large-scale infr
astructures for surveillance and data analysis has made understanding the
impact of privacy a pressing priority. We propose a framework for studying
a fundamental query complexity versus privacy tradeoff in sequential lea
rning. The central question is: how can one perform learning in such a man
ner that makes sure that an overseeing adversary cannot obtain the learned
model by observing the queries. We will examine two formulations of the
model (deterministic and Bayesian)\, and in both cases establish matching
upper and lower bounds on the optimal query complexity\, for a given level
of privacy guarantees. The analysis will exploit on some essential combi
natorial as well as information theoretic structures of the problem\, whic
h we will also discuss.\n\nPapers:\nhttps://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.02136.pdf\n
\nhttps://arxiv.org/abs/1911.06903\n\nhttps://arxiv.org/abs/1909.09836\n\n
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.11976.pdf\n\n \;\n\nBio: Kuang Xu is an
Associate Professor of Operations\, Information and Technology at Stanford
Graduate School of Business\, and Associate Professor by courtesy with th
e Electrical Engineering Department\, Stanford University. Born in Suzhou
\, China\, he received the B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering (2009) fr
om the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign\, and the Ph.D. degree i
n Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (2014) from the Massachusett
s Institute of Technology. His research focuses on understanding fundamen
tal properties and design principles of large-scale stochastic systems usi
ng tools from probability theory and optimization\, with applications in q
ueueing networks\, privacy and machine learning. He is a recipient of the
First Place in the INFORMS George E. Nicholson Student Paper Competition
(2011)\, the Best Paper Award\, as well as the Kenneth C. Sevcik Outstandi
ng Student Paper Award at ACM SIGMETRICS (2013)\, and the ACM SIGMETRICS
Rising Star Research Award (2020). He currently serves as an Associate Edi
tor for Operations Research.
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:108@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210715T103000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20210715T113000
DTSTAMP:20210711T061737Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/equitable-voting-rules/
SUMMARY:Equitable voting rules [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\
n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Omer Tamuz \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and ZOOM
From:\nCaltech\nAbstract:\nMay’s Theorem (1952)\, a celebrated result in
social choice\, provides the foundation for majority rule. May’s crucia
l assumption of symmetry\, often thought of as a procedural equity require
ment\, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical r
oles. We show that a weakening of May’s symmetry assumption allows for a
far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that suc
h rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fractio
n of the population\, but not less than the square root of the population
size. Methodologically\, we introduce techniques from group theory and ill
ustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.\n(wi
th Laurent Bartholdi\, Wade Hann-Caruthers\, Maya Josyula\, and Leeat Yari
v)\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/94614628255
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:117@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211012T143000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211012T153000
DTSTAMP:20211014T055338Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/communicating-with-anecd
otes/
SUMMARY:Communicating with Anecdotes [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Sem
inars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Nicole Immorlica \n Advisors: \n Where: ZOOM From:\nMicros
oft Research\nAbstract:\n\nWe study a model of social learning and communi
cation using hard anecdotal evidence. There are two Bayesian agents (a sen
der and a receiver) who wish to communicate. The receiver must take an act
ion whose payoff depends on their personal preferences and an unknown stat
e of the world. The sender has access to a collection of samples correlate
d with the state of the world\, which we think of as specific anecdotes or
pieces of evidence\, and can send exactly one of these samples to the rec
eiver in order to influence her choice of action. Importantly\, the sender
's personal preferences may differ from the receiver's\, which affects the
sender's strategic choice of which anecdote to send. We show that if the
sender has commitment power\, then they will choose an unbiased and maxima
lly informative communication scheme\, no matter the difference in prefere
nces. Without observability\, however\, even a small difference in prefere
nces can lead to a significant bias in the choice of anecdote\, which the
receiver must then account for. This can significantly reduce the informat
iveness of the signal\, leading to substantial utility loss for both sides
. One implication is informational homophily: a receiver can rationally pr
efer to obtain information from a poorly-informed sender with aligned pref
erences\, rather than a knowledgeable expert whose preferences may differ
from her own.\n\nJoint work with Nika Haghtalab\, Brendan Lucier\, Markus
Mobius\, and Divyarthi Mohan.\n\n \;\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://tau-ac-il
.zoom.us/j/84735509601
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:126@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211103T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211103T123000
DTSTAMP:20211028T141830Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/sampling-dynamics-and-st
able-mixing-in-hawk-dove-games/
SUMMARY:Sampling Dynamics and Stable Mixing in Hawk–Dove Games [ \n G
ame Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Srinivas Arigapudi\n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 F
rom:\nTechnion\nAbstract:\n\nThe hawk–dove game admits two types of equi
libria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium\nin which players in one population
play “hawk” and players in the other population play “dove\,” and
\na symmetric mixed equilibrium. The existing literature on dynamic evolut
ionary models shows that\npopulations will converge to playing one of the
asymmetric pure equilibria from any initial state.\nBy contrast\, we show
that plausible sampling dynamics\, in which agents occasionally revise the
ir actions\nby observing either opponents’ behavior or payoffs in a few
past interactions\, can\ninduce the opposite result: global convergence to
a symmetric mixed equilibrium.\n(with Yuval Heller and Amnon Schreiber)
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:129@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211110T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211110T123000
DTSTAMP:20211104T082354Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/auctions-with-multi-memb
er-bidders/
SUMMARY:Auctions with multi-member bidders [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n
Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Shiran Rachmilevitch \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424
From:\nUniversity of Haifa\nAbstract:\n\nA second-price auction is consi
dered\, in which one of the bidders is a team consisting of several indivi
duals. For these individuals\, the auctioned item is a public good\, in th
e sense that either all of them win it together or all lose. They need to
agree on a bid\, and on splitting the payment to the auctioneer if they wi
n the item. If the competition that the team faces is fierce enough\, then
the model has a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium\, which is symmetric\
, generalizes the weak dominance equilibrium of the ordinary second-price
auction and satisfies intuitive comparative static properties with respect
to the team’s size. A certain modification of the model gives rise to a
symmetric equilibria\, in which only one team member participates in the a
uction and everybody else free ride.
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:133@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211117T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211117T123000
DTSTAMP:20211114T070011Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/strategic-classification
-and-the-allegory-of-the-cave/
SUMMARY:Strategic Classification and the Allegory of the Cave [ \n Game
Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Assistant Professor Nir Rosenfeld \n Advisors: \n Where: B
loomfield 424 From:\nTechnion\nAbstract:\n\nAcross a multitude of domains
and applications\, machine learning has become widespread as a tool for i
nforming decisions about humans and for humans. Nonetheless\, tools used i
n practice are rarely designed to account for the ways in which humans res
pond to learned models and their predictions. The goal of this talk is to
initiate discussion regarding the part game theory can play in the develop
ment of behaviorally-aware learning frameworks.\nAs a starting point\, I w
ill present the problem of strategic classification\, in which users strat
egically modify their features (at a cost) to obtain favorable predictive
outcomes from a classifier. I will then describe some of our work in this
field\, both recent and current\, using these to demonstrate how even mild
forms of strategic behavior can dramatically transform the learning probl
em. Finally\, I will argue that while the original problem formulation is
somewhat narrow\, there is untapped potential in strategic classification
as a basis on which more elaborate forms of economic modeling can be appli
ed.
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:135@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211124T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211124T123000
DTSTAMP:20211124T061619Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/the-gatekeepers-effect/
SUMMARY:The Gatekeeper's Effect [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars
\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Dr. Moran Koren \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and
ZOOM From:\nTel Aviv University\nAbstract:\n\nMany selection processes co
ntain a ``gatekeeper". The gatekeeper's goal is to examine an applicant's
suitability for a position before both parties incur substantial costs.
Intuitively\, a gatekeeper should reduce selection costs by sifting unli
kely applicants. However\, as we show\, this is not always the case sinc
e the gatekeeper's introduction inadvertently interferes with the candidat
e's self-selection. We study the conditions under which a gatekeeper im
proves the system's efficiency and those under which it induces inefficien
cy. Additionally\, we show that selection correctness can\, at times\, b
e improved by allowing for strategic gatekeeping.\n\n \;\n\n \;\n\
nZoom Link\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/92624364096
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:143@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211208T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211208T123000
DTSTAMP:20211206T063154Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/markovian-persuasion/
SUMMARY:Markovian Persuasion [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n
\n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Dimitry Shaiderman \n Advisors: \n Where: Zoom From:\nTel
Aviv University\nAbstract:\n\nIn the classical Bayesian persuasion model a
n informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. T
he informed player\, the sender\, knows the state of nature\, while the
uninformed one\, the receiver\, does not. The informed player partially sh
ares his private information with the receiver and the latter then\, base
d on her belief about the state\, takes an action. This action determines
\, together with the state of nature\, the utility of both players. We co
nsider a dynamic Bayesian persuasion situation where the state of nature e
volves according to a Markovian law. In this repeated persuasion model an
optimal disclosure strategy of the sender should\, at any period\, balanc
e between getting high stage payoff and future implications on the receiv
ers' beliefs. We discuss optimal strategies under different discount fact
ors and characterize when the asymptotic value achieves the maximal value
possible.\n\nJoint work with Ehud Lehrer\n\nlink to the paper\n\n \;
\n\nLink to Zoom\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/92624364096
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:144@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211215T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211215T123000
DTSTAMP:20211209T102211Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/stochastic-games-with-sh
ift-invariant-payoffs/
SUMMARY:Stochastic Games with Shift-Invariant Payoffs [ \n Game Theory
Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Prof. Eilon Solan\n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 a
nd ZOOM From:\nTel Aviv University\nAbstract:\n\nI will describe recent re
sults on the existence and characterization of equilibrium payoffs in mult
iplayer repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs\, and then discuss an
extension to stochastic games: two-player nonzero-sum stochastic games wit
h shift-invariant payoffs.\n\nJoint work with Janos Flesch\n\nZoom Link\n\
nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/92624364096
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:147@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211222T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211222T123000
DTSTAMP:20211216T130254Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/herd-design/
SUMMARY:Herd Design [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Ronen Gradwohl \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and
ZOOM From:\nAriel University\nAbstract:\n\nThe classic herding model exami
nes the asymptotic behavior of agents who observe their predecessors' acti
ons as well as a private signal from an exogenous information structure. I
n this paper we introduce a self-interested sender into the model and stud
y her problem of designing this information structure. If agents cannot ob
serve each other the model reduces to Bayesian persuasion. However\, when
agents observe predecessors' actions\, they may learn from each other\, po
tentially harming the sender. We identify necessary and sufficient conditi
ons under which the sender can nevertheless obtain the same utility as whe
n the agents are unable to observe each other.\n\nJoint work with Itai Ari
eli and Rann Smorodinsky\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/926243
64096
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:150@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211229T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20211229T123000
DTSTAMP:20211226T095922Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/participatory-budgeting-
via-a-vcg-like-mechanism/
SUMMARY:Participatory Budgeting via a VCG-Like Mechanism [ \n Game Theo
ry Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Jonathan Wagner \n Advisors: \n Where: ZOOM From:\nTechnio
n\nAbstract:\n\nWe study a special divisible Participatory Budgeting model
that involves taxation decisions. Agents collectively choose the level of
tax collected from them to finance the city's public budget\, and in turn
the allocation of the resulting budget among different alternatives. We i
mplement a mechanism that is basically a VCG mechanism with some necessary
adjustments taking place (Most importantly\, our model violates the cruci
al assumption of quasi-linear utilities)\, that features stronger strategy
-proofness results as compared to existing divisible Participatory Budgeti
ng models. Moreover\, we specify the conditions that guarantee: (a) tha
t payments vanish with the population's size\, and (b) that non-negative p
ayments for all agents are feasible.\n\n \;\n\nJoint work with Reshef
Meir\n\n \;\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/92624364096
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:153@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220105T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220105T123000
DTSTAMP:20220104T102004Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/submodularity-in-interde
pendent-values/
SUMMARY:Submodularity in Interdependent Values [ \n Game Theory Seminar
\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: DR. Alon Eden \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and
ZOOM From:\nHarvard University\nAbstract:\n\nThe celebrated Interdependent
values (IDV) model captures settings where buyers have partial informatio
n regarding their value for the item being sold. In the IDV model\, eac
h buyer $i$ has a private piece of information\, a signal $s_i$\, and thei
r value is determined by all signals. This is represented by a valuation f
unction $v_i(s_1\, ...\, s_n)$. While this model is more realistic than th
e private values model (that assumes buyers know their value)\, it is much
less understood. Most works in the IDV model assume that there's only one
type of item being sold\, and that the valuation function $v_i$ is public
information.\n\n \;\n\nIn this talk\, I will present the first positi
ve results relaxing these assumptions. In order to obtain these results\,
we identify an interesting condition on the structure in which informatio
n affects valuations---submodularity over signals. Using this condition\,
we obtain a mechanism that achieves a 4-approximation to general combinato
rial auction settings\, and $O(log^2 n)$-approximation to a single item au
ction\, when the valuation $v_i$ is private information.\n\n \;\n\nBas
ed on joint works with Michal Feldman\, Amos Fiat\, Kira Goldner\, Anna Ka
rlin\, and Shuran Zheng.\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/926243
64096
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:162@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220112T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220112T123000
DTSTAMP:20220109T060152Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/populations-feasible-pos
terior-beliefs/
SUMMARY:Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs [ \n Game Theory Semina
r\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Prof. Yakov Babichenko \n Advisors: \n Where: ZOOM From:\n
Technion\nAbstract:\n\n \;\n\nWe consider a population of Bayesian age
nts who share a common prior over some finite state space and where each a
gent receives a private signal and forms a posterior belief. We ask which
distributions over aggregate joint posterior beliefs are feasible. We prov
ide a necessary and sufficient condition for such distribution to be feasi
ble. We study the implication of our result to a polarization of posterior
s in a population of agents. In addition\, we consider a private Bayesian
persuasion problem and\, using our characterization\, provide an optimal p
olicy for the sender.\n\n(Joint with Itai Arieli)\n\nZoom Link\nhttps://te
chnion.zoom.us/j/92624364096
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:172@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220302T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220302T123000
DTSTAMP:20220224T062739Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/learning-to-cooperate-an
d-compete-in-diplomacy/
SUMMARY:Learning to Cooperate and Compete in Diplomacy [ \n Game Theory
Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Noam Brown \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 From:\n
Facebook\nAbstract:\n\nAI has made incredible progress in purely adversari
al games such as chess\, go\, and poker. However\, the real world involves
a complex mixture of cooperation and competition\, sometimes with irratio
nal or suboptimal participants\, and in these settings past AI techniques
fall apart. For this reason\, Diplomacy\, a popular game focused on negoti
ation and alliance-building\, has served as a long-standing grand challeng
e for AI that requires radically different techniques compared to prior ga
mes and has major implications if AI algorithms eventually succeed. In thi
s talk I will describe Diplomacy and cover recent research results that ha
ve allowed our group to achieve expert-level human performance in the no-c
ommunication version of this game via a combination of imitation learning
on human data and self-play reinforcement learning. In particular\, I will
cover a new regret minimization technique that converges to a coarse corr
elated equilibrium regularized toward a human prior. I will conclude with
a discussion of the challenges that await as research shifts toward versio
ns of the game in which players can privately communicate and therefore co
rrelate their actions.
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:186@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220330T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220330T123000
DTSTAMP:20220325T053249Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/necessary-and-sufficient
-conditions-for-determinacy-of-asymptotically-stationary-equilibria-in-olg
-mode/
SUMMARY:Necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy of asymptotical
ly stationary equilibria in olg mode [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n
Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Anna Rubinchik\n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and
Zoom Link From:\nWestern Galilee College\nAbstract:\n\nWe propose a crit
erion for verifying whether an equilibrium of an overlapping generation mo
del is amenable to local policy analysis\, i.e.\, is determinate. The crit
erion is applicable for a generic set of parameters of the model\, and in
case of indeterminacy\, it indicates the nature of the problem: multiplici
ty of equilibria or their absence for near-by parameters.\n\nThe criterion
can be applied to models with infinite past and future as well as those w
ith a truncated past.\n\nThe baseline equilibrium is not required to be a
steady state\, and economic parameters\, for example endowments\, can chan
ge over time.\n\nHowever\, asymptotically\, the equilibrium should be stat
ionary\, though the two limiting paths at either end of the time-line do n
ot have to be the same. If they are\, conditions for local uniqueness of e
quilibrium are far more stringent for an economy with a truncated past as
compared to its counterpart with an infinite past.\n\nWe illustrate our ma
in result using a text-book model with a single physical good and a two-pe
riod life-cycle. In this model our criterion is used to identify the three
possible cases: determinacy\, and hence\, local uniqueness\, and indeterm
inacy: multiplicity and non-existence of equilibria in the neighbourhood o
f the baseline. (The corresponding paper is here)\n\n \;\n\nZoom Lin
k \n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/94175815347
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:191@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220406T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220406T123000
DTSTAMP:20220401T103442Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/communicating-with-anecd
otes-2/
SUMMARY:Communicating with Anecdotes [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Sem
inars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Divyarthi Mohan\n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and Z
OOM From:\nTel Aviv University\nAbstract:\n\nWe study a communication game
between a sender and receiver where the sender has access to a set of inf
ormative signals about a state of the world. The sender chooses one of her
signals and communicates it to the receiver. We call this an ``anecdote''
. The receiver takes an action\, yielding a utility for both players. Send
er and receiver both care about the state of the world but are also influe
nced by a personal preference so that their ideal actions differ. We chara
cterize perfect Bayesian equilibria when the sender cannot commit to a par
ticular communication scheme. In this setting the sender faces ``persuasio
n temptation'': she is tempted to select a more biased anecdote to influen
ce the receiver's action. Anecdotes are still informative to the receiver
but persuasion comes at the cost of precision. This gives rise to ``inform
ational homophily'' where the receiver prefers to listen to like-minded se
nders because they provide higher-precision signals. We show that for fat-
tailed anecdote distributions the receiver might even prefer to talk to po
orly informed senders with aligned preferences rather than a knowledgeable
expert whose preferences may differ from her own because the expert's kno
wledge also gives her likely access to highly biased anecdotes. We also sh
ow that under commitment differences in personal preferences no longer aff
ect communication and the sender will generally report the most representa
tive anecdote closest to the posterior mean for common distributions.\n\nJ
oint work with Nika Haghtalab\, Nicole Immorlica\, Brendan Lucier\, and Ma
rkus Mobius.\n\nBe rational and attend.\n\n \;\n\nZoom Link\n\n \;
\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/94175815347
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:195@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220413T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220413T123000
DTSTAMP:20220407T190719Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/learning-in-the-marriage
-market-the-economics-of-dating/
SUMMARY:Learning in the Marriage Market: The Economics of Dating [ \n G
ame Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Daniel Fershtman\n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and
ZOOM From:\nTel Aviv University\nAbstract:\n\nWe develop a dynamic model
of two-sided matching with search and learning frictions. Agents engage in
a search for a potential partner and\, upon meeting\, may gradually acqui
re information about their compatibility as a couple\, a process we refer
to as dating. Dating is mutually exclusive and\, as such\, introduces a tr
adeoff between becoming better informed about one's compatibility with a p
otential partner and meeting other\, more promising\, potential partners.
We derive a closed-form solution for the unique steady-state equilibrium w
hen agents are ex-ante homogeneous\, and characterize it when they are ver
tically heterogeneous. In the steady state\, agents date for longer than i
s socially optimal\, an inefficiency that is alleviated by a small degree
of asymmetry in dating costs between partners. Furthermore\, block segrega
tion fails\, yet matching is assortative -- in a probabilistic sense we re
fer to as single-crossing in marriage probabilities. Motivated by recent a
dvances in matching technologies in decentralized markets\, we study the e
ffects of improvements in search and learning technologies and show that t
hey differ qualitatively.\n\njoint with Yair Antler and Daniel Bird\n\nBe
rational and attend\,\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/941758153
47
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:196@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220427T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220427T000000
DTSTAMP:20220424T062033Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/dynamic-screening/
SUMMARY:Dynamic Screening [ \n Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \
n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: David Lagziel \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and
ZOOM From:\nBen-Gurion University\nAbstract:\n\nWe study dynamic screening
problems where elements are subjected to noisy evaluations and\, in every
stage\, some of the elements are rejected while the remaining ones are in
dependently re-evaluated in subsequent stages.\n\nWe prove that\, ceteris
paribus\, the quality of a dynamic screening process is not monotonic in t
he number of stages.\n\nSpecifically\, we examine the accepted elements' v
alues and show that adding a single stage to a screening process may produ
ce inferior results\, in terms of stochastic dominance\, whereas increasin
g the number of stages substantially leads to a first-best outcome.\n\nJoi
nt work with Ehud Lehrer\n\n \;\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.
us/j/94175815347
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:207@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220511T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220511T123000
DTSTAMP:20220508T053524Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/mentors-and-recombinator
s-multi-dimensional-social-learning/
SUMMARY:Mentors and Recombinators: Multi-Dimensional Social Learning [ \n
Game Theory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Yuval Heller \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and Z
OOM From:\nBar-Ilan University\nAbstract:\n\n \;\n\nWe study games in
which the set of strategies is multi-dimensional\, and new agents might le
arn various strategic dimensions from different mentors. This induces a ne
w family of recombinator dynamics that generalises the standard replicator
dynamics\, in which each new agent learns everything from a single mentor
. We characterise the stable equilibria under these dynamics\, and we show
that they predict novel behaviour in various applications\, such as coope
ration supported by dominated strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma\, and s
tability of robust traits at the expense of specialised traits.\n\n \;
\n\nJoint with Omer Edhan\, Ziv Hellman\, Srinivas Arigapudi.\n\n\nZoom Li
nk\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/j/94175815347
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:211@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220518T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220518T123000
DTSTAMP:20220515T045358Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/calibrated-forecasting-a
nd-persuasion/
SUMMARY:Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion [ \n Game Theory Seminar\
n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Atulya Jain \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and ZOO
M From:\nHEC Paris\nAbstract:\n\n \;\n\nHow should an expert send fore
casts to maximize her payoff subject to passing the calibration test? We c
onsider a dynamic game where an expert provides probability forecasts to a
decision maker. The decision maker uses past outcomes to verify the claim
s of the expert using the calibration test. Under reasonable assumptions\,
we characterize the dynamic forecasting game in terms of a static persuas
ion problem. In doing so\, we determine the optimal calibrated forecasting
strategy. We compare the attainable payoffs for an informed and an uninfo
rmed expert. Finally\, we compare the analysis when the decision maker is
a regret minimizer. We show that the expert can always guarantee the cali
bration benchmark and\, in some instances\, she can guarantee strictly mor
e.\n\n \;\n\nJoint with with Vianney Perchet\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://t
echnion.zoom.us/j/94175815347
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:214@web.iem.technion.ac.il
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220525T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220525T123000
DTSTAMP:20220522T081142Z
URL:https://web.iem.technion.ac.il/site/iemevents/monopoly-product-quality
-and-flexible-learning/
SUMMARY:Monopoly\, Product Quality\, and Flexible Learning [ \n Game Th
eory Seminar\n Seminars\n \n ]
DESCRIPTION:By: Jeffrey Mensch \n Advisors: \n Where: Bloomfield 424 and
ZOOM From:\nThe Hebrew University\nAbstract:\n\n \;\n\nA seller offer
s a buyer a schedule of transfers and associated product qualities\, as in
Mussa and Rosen (1978). After observing this schedule\, the buyer chooses
a flexible costly signal about his type. We show it is without loss to fo
cus on a class of mechanisms that compensate the buyer for his learning co
sts. Using these mechanisms\, we prove quality always lies strictly below
the efficient level. This strict downward distortion holds even if the buy
er acquires no information or when the buyer’s posterior type is the hig
hest possible given his signal\, reversing the “no distortion at the top
” feature that holds when information is exogenous.\n\n \;\n\nJoint
with with Doron Ravid\n\n \;\n\nZoom Link\n\nhttps://technion.zoom.us/
j/94175815347
CATEGORIES:Game Theory Seminar,Seminars
END:VEVENT
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